JPMorgan Chase & Co. (JPM) Earnings Call Transcript & Summary

July 12, 2024

New York Stock Exchange US Financials Banks earnings 61 min

Earnings Call Speaker Segments

Jeremy Barnum

executive
#1

Appreciate it, and hello everybody. Starting with the first page, we recorded $18.1 billion in net income, earnings per share of $6.12, and $51 billion in revenue, alongside a 28% ROTCE. Driving those figures were a $7.9 billion net gain connected to Visa shares, plus a $1 billion contribution of appreciated Visa stock to our foundation. On top of that, corporate carried $546 million in net investment securities losses. Once you remove those items, what the company actually produced was $13.1 billion in net income, $4.40 in EPS, and a 20% ROTCE. Let me share a few key points. Within CIB, investment banking fees were up 50% compared to the same period last year, and 17% higher than the prior quarter, while market revenue grew 10% year-on-year. Over in CCB, we reached a record count of first-time investors and saw robust customer acquisition in checking accounts and card, plus we continue to observe strong net inflows throughout AWM. Before I dive further into the results, I should mention that starting this quarter, the First Republic contribution will no longer be explicitly broken out in the presentation. Going forward, we'll only call it out specifically when it serves as a meaningful driver in the year-on-year comparison. Just to note, First Republic came into the fold last May, which means the same quarter a year ago reflects only two months of its results, while we now have a full three months. On top of that, most costs a year ago were booked at the corporate level, but today they largely sit within the appropriate business segment. Moving on to Page 2, where we look at results across the whole company. Revenue came in at $51 billion, which is $8.6 billion higher, a 20% increase compared with a year earlier. If you strip out the Visa gain I referred to a moment ago, along with the $2.7 billion bargain purchase gain from First Republic recorded a year ago, revenue was $43.1 billion, representing a $3.4 billion rise, or 9%. Excluding Markets, net interest income rose $568 million, a 3% gain. That came from balance sheet mix effects, increased rates, more revolving card balances, and having an extra month of First Republic-related NII — partly counterbalanced by deposit margin squeeze and smaller deposit balances. Outside Markets, noninterest revenue climbed $7.3 billion, or 56%. Strip out the factors I just listed, and the increase was $2.1 billion, or 21%, mostly from stronger investment banking revenue plus asset management fees. Net investment securities losses appeared in both periods; Markets revenue grew $731 million, or 10%, compared with a year earlier. Expenses reached $23.7 billion, rising $2.9 billion, or 14%, year-on-year. If we set aside the foundation contribution I mentioned earlier, our expenses rose 9%, largely because of compensation—this includes pay tied to revenue—as well as having more employees. On credit costs, we saw $3.1 billion, which breaks down into $2.2 billion of net charge-offs and an $821 million net reserve build. Net charge-offs climbed $820 million compared with a year ago, with Card accounting for most of that. Within the net reserve build, consumer made up $609 million and wholesale made up $189 million. Turning to the balance sheet and capital discussion on Page 3: we ended the quarter with a CET1 ratio of 15.3%, up 30 basis points from the prior quarter. Net income was the main driver, although capital distributions and higher RWA offset a large portion of that. As everyone is aware, CCAR wrapped up a couple of weeks back, and we've already put out several of the main takeaways. Let me run through those points once more. Our preliminary SCB stands at 3.3%, even though the final SCB may come in higher. That preliminary SCB — which is above the 2.9% requirement currently in place — produces a standardized CET1 ratio requirement of 12.3%, taking effect in the fourth quarter of 2024. Lastly, the firm shared that the Board plans to raise the quarterly common stock dividend to $1.25 per share from $1.15, beginning in the third quarter of 2024. Now let's move to our businesses, beginning with CCB on Page 4. CCB posted net income of $4.2 billion on revenue of $17.7 billion, an increase of 3% versus a year ago. Within banking and wealth management, revenue fell 5% compared with last year, driven by reduced deposits and deposit margin compression, partly offset by wealth management revenue growth. Average deposits declined 7% year-on-year and 1% from the prior quarter. Client investment assets rose 14% year-on-year, mostly on the back of market performance. In home lending, revenue reached $1.3 billion, climbing 31% year-on-year, largely because of higher NII, which included one additional month of the First Republic portfolio. Shifting to Card services and Auto, revenue grew 14% year-on-year, chiefly from higher Card NII and increased revolving balances. Card balances grew 12%, which shows we're bringing in accounts at a solid pace and that revolve keeps returning to more typical levels. Over in Auto, we booked $10.8 billion in originations — that's a 10% drop, coming off a really strong prior-year comparison — and we did it while holding margins at healthy levels. On expenses, we landed at $9.4 billion, a 13% increase compared with a year ago. The main drivers there are the First Republic costs that now flow through the lines-of-business, as I mentioned before, along with field compensation and the continued build-out in technology and marketing. Turning to credit performance for the quarter, credit costs were $2.6 billion, which includes net charge-offs of $2.1 billion — that's $813 million more than a year ago — with the bulk of it coming from Card as newer vintages age and credit keeps normalizing. Turning to the reserve, we added $579 million net, with Card again the main driver thanks to growth in loans and changes to some macroeconomic assumptions. Moving on to Page 5 and the Commercial and Investment Bank. That segment posted $5.9 billion in net income, with revenue reaching $17.9 billion. You'll see that we now give revenue figures by business, plus a split of banking and payments revenue across client coverage segments, which we think best shows the trends that matter along both key dimensions of the wholesale franchise. IB fees were up 50% compared with a year earlier this quarter, and we took the Number #1 spot with a year-to-date wallet share of 9.5%. Advisory fees were up 45%, and the main reason was that several sizable deals closed during the same week a year earlier. Underwriting fees also climbed considerably, with equity up 56% and debt up 51%, supported by favorable market conditions. As for what comes next, we're pleased with how the quarter progressed compared with both the year-ago period and the preceding one; we remain cautiously optimistic about the pipeline, though many of the same headwinds are still with us. One more thing worth noting: refinancing that was pulled forward contributed meaningfully to the strong first-half performance. Turning to payments, revenue came in at $4.5 billion, a 4% decline compared with a year earlier, since compression in deposit margin and greater client credits tied to deposits were mostly counterbalanced by growth in fees. Shifting to markets, overall revenue reached $7.8 billion, climbing 10% year-on-year. Fixed income increased 5%, with securitized products continuing to perform well. Equity markets, meanwhile, rose 21%, as equity derivatives gained on stronger client activity. Prime delivered record revenue, fueled by growth and client balances against favorable equity market levels. Security services brought in $1.3 billion in revenue, 3% higher than a year ago, powered by greater volumes and market levels, though deposit margin compression offset much of that. Expenses totaled $9.2 billion, an increase of 12% from the prior year, mainly because of compensation linked to higher revenue, legal costs, and non-compensation expenses tied to volume. Within banking and payments, average loans grew 2% year-on-year, reflecting the effect of the First Republic acquisition, and were unchanged from the previous quarter.

Jeremy Barnum

executive
#2

Demand for new loans continues to be soft. Middle-market and large corporate clients are still being somewhat cautious because of the economic environment, and revolver utilization is below its pre-pandemic level. Beyond that, the capital markets are open and giving these customers another option besides traditional bank lending; within CRE, high rates continue to weigh on both originations and payoffs. Client deposits averaged a 2% increase from the same period last year and were about flat from one quarter to the next. Finally, credit costs reached $384 million. The $220 million net reserve build largely came from moving the First Republic portfolio onto the Firm's modeled approach. Net charge-offs were $164 million, and about half of that was in office. Wrapping up the business segments, let's turn to asset and wealth management, which you'll find on Page 6. Net income there came to $1.3 billion, and the pre-tax margin was 32%. We brought in $5.3 billion in revenue, which is up 6% compared with the same period last year. What drove that? Management fees grew thanks to higher average market levels and solid net inflows, and we also saw more brokerage activity — though deposit margin compression offset a good portion of those gains. On the expense side, we had $3.5 billion, which is 12% higher than a year ago. The main reasons were increased compensation — largely tied to revenue — along with the continued expansion of our private banking advisor teams. Long-term net inflows for the quarter hit $52 billion, with equities and fixed income leading the way. And in liquidity, net inflows totaled $16 billion. Assets under management reached $3.7 trillion, a 15% gain compared with the same period last year. Client assets totaled $5.4 trillion, rising 18% year over year, helped by stronger market levels and ongoing net inflows. Loans and deposits, meanwhile, held steady versus the previous quarter. Turning to corporate results on Page 7: net income came in at $6.8 billion, with revenue of $10.1 billion. If you set aside the Visa-related gain booked this quarter and the First Republic bargain purchase gain from a year earlier, noninterest revenue climbed roughly $450 million year over year. Net interest income rose $626 million compared with a year ago, reflecting balance sheet mix and elevated rates. Costs came in at $1.6 billion, which was a $427 million increase compared with the same period a year earlier. If you set aside foundation contribution costs, they fell $573 million versus last year, mostly because First Republic-related costs shifted from corporate over into the appropriate segments. That brings us to the outlook, which you'll find on Page 8. For 2024, our guidance and the underlying drivers are the same as what we shared at Investor Day. We still anticipate NII and NII ex-markets of roughly $91 billion, adjusted expense of around $92 million, and on the credit side, a Card net charge-off rate near 3.4%. Wrapping things up, this quarter's reported results were outstanding, marking record revenue as well as record net income. Yet the key point is that once you set aside those sizable items, the core results are still very robust. And as we always do, our attention stays on carrying out our work with discipline. So with that, we're ready to take your questions.

Steven Chubak

analyst
#3

Hi. Good morning, Jeremy.

Jeremy Barnum

executive
#4

Good morning Steve.

Steven Chubak

analyst
#5

I'd like to begin with a question about capital. There are some signals that the Fed may be looking at making favorable changes to both Basel III endgame and the way the GSIB surcharge is calculated, and I'm aware you've been advocating for that for a while. When you look at various capital scenarios, would these revisions be significant enough to allow for a higher normalized ROTCE at the Firm than the 17% target? And if that's the case, how would that shape or influence your willingness to do buybacks moving forward?

Jeremy Barnum

executive
#6

Right, okay. Thanks Steve; and actually before I get to the question, I should remind everybody that Jamie can't be with us because of a travel conflict overseas, so I'm the only one here today. Okay. Good question about capital and the ROTCE. Let me address the ROTCE part first. Put simply, my response would be no. It's difficult to envision any scenario across the full spectrum of possible capital outcomes that would mean an upward revision to ROTCE. If you consider how we've framed this, we've stated that prior to the Basel III endgame proposal, we had a 17% through cycle target, and that although you can picture a variety of possible results, the overwhelming majority of them mean the denominator gets bigger; and while we had thoughts about altering the perimeter and repricing, all of which remain somewhat in play, most of those should be seen as offsets rather than items that would genuinely raise the ROTCE. And I don't believe that response has really shifted. So for now, that's my position, which leads nicely into the next point, which is yes, we've been seeing the same press coverage that you have, and it's enjoyable and intriguing to hypothesize about what might happen here, but the truth is, we have no knowledge — neither do you. We don't know whether the press coverage can be trusted. And so in that regard, I feel that concerning the overall capital return and buyback trajectory, little has truly changed compared to what I presented at Investor Day, the remarks I offered then, the remarks Jamie offered then, along with the remarks Jamie offered the following week at an industry conference. So perhaps I'll just quickly recap for everyone's benefit what we believe that to be, which is first, we do acknowledge that our present approach to capital return and buybacks results in a CET1 ratio that keeps expanding; but clearly we will operate the company across the cycle over time at a sensible CET1 ratio with sensible buffers relative to our requirements. Once every bit of ambiguity has been cleared away, how the Capital gets put to work, in one form or another, comes down to timing rather than possibility. Regarding the capital hierarchy, it deserves mention that this too is something that hasn't shifted, so let me run through it briefly. As you're aware, expanding the business through organic means and through acquisitions, plus a sustainable dividend — and within that framework, notably, the Board's stated plan to raise it to $1.25 represents a 19% increase over last year, which speaks to how we've performed and counts as a return of capital. Then lastly, buybacks — though that hierarchy doesn't bind us to give back 100% of the capital generation in any particular quarter. Thus, as was stated here today, once you weigh what it costs us not to put the capital to use against the chances to put it to use beyond the Firm, imagining a setting where that tradeoff favors waiting more strongly is rather difficult. With all of that in mind, and apologies for the lengthy response, we're still at ease with the present level of excess capital. And per Jamie's remarks, we genuinely keep viewing it as earnings in store, perhaps more than anything else.

Steven Chubak

analyst
#7

There's no reason to say sorry, Jeremy. That perspective was genuinely useful. Perhaps for my follow-up regarding NII. You've stayed remarkably steady in simply calling out the danger tied to NII over earning, particularly given possible deposit attrition, plus repricing headwinds. During Q2, we did observe at minimum a bit of easing in repricing pressures. Deposit balances also proved sturdier during what is a seasonally soft quarter for deposit growth. So considering the proof that certain deposit pressures seem to be fading. Do you think NII could potentially normalize upward? And in terms of stabilization, where might that level end up eventually?

Jeremy Barnum

executive
#8

Yes. Steve, that's an intriguing question. Let's discuss deposit balances then. Yes, I take your point that balance pressures are easing somewhat. If you examine the system in its entirety, and just walk through it, Q2 remains somewhat of a headwind. Loan growth is modest and insufficient to counterbalance that. And RRP appears to have roughly stabilized around where it currently sits, and there are grounds to think it may not decline much further, even though that might shift at any time and that could inject additional reserves into the system. Yet overall, netting across all those different effects, we continue to believe net headwinds exist for deposit balances. Thus when considering our balance outlook, we view it as flat to slightly lower perhaps, with our market share and growth ambitions roughly countering those system-wide headwinds. So regarding normalizing upward, I suppose it hinges on compared to what. But I believe it is certainly too soon to be declaring the conclusion of the over earning story or the normalization story. Plainly, the key shift in our present guidance compared to what we provided earlier in the year, which suggested far more sequential decline, is merely the Fed outlook changing. So the primary distinction there is two cuts against six cuts. But clearly, judging from the most recent completion data and such, you could typically return to a scenario featuring far more cuts in the yield curve. So we shall see how that unfolds; and ultimately, we are sort of concentrated on simply operating the business, acknowledging and attempting not to be diverted by what stays some degree of over earning, whatever that may be.

Steven Chubak

analyst
#9

Got it, Jeremy. I really appreciate you answering my questions.

Jeremy Barnum

executive
#10

Thank you, Steve.

Saul Martinez

analyst
#11

Morning, and thanks for fielding this. Jeremy, could you bring us up to date regarding the stress capital buffer? You pointed out, clearly, that in your view the Fed made a mistake tied to OCI. Could you simply help us understand how the back-and-forth with the Fed is going? Does some procedure exist for revising the SCB upward? And if so, please describe how that procedure works.

Jeremy Barnum

executive
#12

Sure. I won't say anything regarding any discussions with the Fed. I won't verify or dispute that such discussions are even happening; those matters are confidential. So — and then suppose we turn to the question of timing, correct? As you're aware, the stress capital buffer that has been published, 3.3%, is only a preliminary figure. Under the rules, the Fed must put that out no later than August 31, though it could arrive earlier. You brought up a mistake in the computation; that's not terminology we've adopted. What we understand — or rather, what our view is — is that the quantity of OCI gain reflected in the results the Fed disclosed struck us as counterintuitively large. And were you to make adjustments along lines we consider sensible, the result would be a somewhat larger stress capital buffer. Whether the Fed concurs, and whether they choose to implement such a revision, rests with them, and we'll find out what unfolds. The bigger takeaway, I'd say, is that when you examine the industry overall and place us within it alongside some elevated pro forma SCB, whatever figure one could imagine, what emerges yet again is a fair amount of fluctuation in the stress capital buffer's change from one year to the next across numerous firms. And to restate — one more illustration of something we've frequently noted through the years: it's unpredictable, it lacks transparency, it renders managing a bank's capital extremely difficult. It produces unnecessarily large management buffers, and in our view it's genuinely not a good method of operating. So that's all I'll say.

Saul Martinez

analyst
#13

All right, understood. That helps. I want to build on Steve's question about returning capital. In your answer, I believe you framed it as a question of when, not whether. And clearly, Jamie isn't here. You're not able to speak on his behalf. But he appears to have displayed only modest appetite for either a special dividend or repurchases at today's valuations. Could you tell us how you're weighing the different possibilities? Any fresh thinking regarding a special dividend? And is it possible to pursue other moves, such as substantially raising the dividend payout — essentially a step-function bump, then holding it level and growing your earnings into it gradually? Maybe you could give us a sense of how you view the choices at your disposal for putting that capital to work.

Jeremy Barnum

executive
#14

Sure. What I'd suggest is that you go read — in fact, I have Jamie's remarks from the industry conference you attended the week following Investor Day, since he chose to provide a fair amount of detail on these matters and touch on several of these points. As I recall, his statement there regarding the special dividend was that it isn't truly a preference; we hear that a lot of our investors would not consider that especially attractive, and he acknowledged exactly that it wouldn't be, say, our top pick. So the bigger takeaway, I think, is simply this — speaking a bit to what you asked, the toolkit holds quite a few instruments, and these are genuinely the same instruments that sit within our capital hierarchy. Thus, above all else, our aim is to put capital toward organic or inorganic growth; next comes the dividend, and my sense is we will always wish to keep it at a level that's sustainable, and sustainable too under stress conditions. So that remains our approach on that front. Then, once all that is done, buybacks come last. And Jamie has stated publicly for more than 10 years, across numerous shareholder letters I believe, how he evaluates price alongside buybacks and valuation, and price does matter. So that, roughly, captures the full set of options, I suppose.

Saul Martinez

analyst
#15

Okay, great. Thanks a lot.

Jeremy Barnum

executive
#16

Thanks Saul.

Ken Usdin

analyst
#17

Much appreciated. Morning, Jeremy. It's really good to see how investment banking fees have moved — rising quarter over quarter and 50% versus a year ago. I noticed you were on TV earlier mentioning that regulatory worries persist somewhat when it comes to advisory; and obviously the anticipated debt pull-forward didn't materialize, since DCM delivered strongly once more. I'd just like to know where you think the current backdrop sits compared with what's possible. And where does the conversation stand across those three main categories regarding how this compares now versus a possible backdrop that might still lie ahead? Thank you.

Jeremy Barnum

executive
#18

Yeah. Appreciate it, Ken. This is progress, correct? What I mean is, we're glad to witness this progress. There's been talk for a while about a depressed (ph) banking fee wallet, and it's encouraging to witness both the year-on-year pop off that low base and a solid sequential gain. That's my first point. Regarding conversation and engagement, it has certainly picked up. The dialogue around ECM has picked up and the dialogue around M&A is fairly strong too; so these are all positive developments that give us encouragement and hope that we might be witnessing a somewhat better trend here. That said, there are meaningful caveats. On the DCM side, sure, we made pull-forward remarks during the first quarter, yet we continue to believe this second quarter still contains a good deal of pull forward, so we remain fairly cautious regarding the year's second half. Crucially, much of the activity consists of refinancing rather than, say, acquisition finance. Thus the fact that M&A is still somewhat subdued when it comes to actual deals creates knock-on consequences for DCM too. And when refi makes up a larger share of the wallet, the pull-forward risk grows somewhat. On ECM, viewing it from a distance (ph), you could pose the question that, considering how the overall indices have performed, you'd assume this would be a truly booming setting for IPOs, for instance. And although things are getting better, they're not quite as strong as you'd otherwise anticipate. That stems from several factors, among them the widely discussed point that the degree to which large industries' performance depends on just a handful of stocks, while the mid-cap tech growth segment and other areas that would normally fuel IPOs have seen far more subdued performance. Additionally, much of the private capital raised a few years back came in at rather elevated valuations. So sometimes, those considering IPOs might be facing down rounds, which is a problem. Even though IPO performance in the secondary market has gotten a lot better in a meaningful way, and in certain instances that's true, there are still folks who worry about it; so that creates somewhat of a cloud hanging over the space. My hope is that as time passes, that concern diminishes and the trend becomes somewhat stronger. And certainly, when it comes to advisory, the regulatory cloud persists and is still present; therefore we'll simply need to wait and observe how that unfolds.

Ken Usdin

analyst
#19

Thanks. I appreciate the update, Jeremy. I just have one question about the consumer side. Is there anything you're picking up on from folks who had been holding out for that stabilization in credit card delinquencies? Your loss rates are obviously landing right where you'd anticipated, and 30 days looked pretty much unchanged while 90 days ticked down slightly. Is that a seasonal pattern? Is it simply a favorable rate of change? Any perspective would be helpful. Thanks.

Jeremy Barnum

executive
#20

Yeah. My sense remains that on the Card charge-off and delinquency front, there simply isn't a whole lot worth noting. It continues to reflect normalization rather than deterioration. It matches what we expected. Like I've said, we consistently examine things pretty carefully within the cohort, within income cohorts. Looking there, particularly at spend patterns for instance, you can detect a modest amount of evidence pointing to behavior that aligns with some softness among lower income segments, where spending rotates somewhat away from discretionary and toward non-discretionary. Yet those effects are genuinely pretty subtle, and to my way of thinking they're completely in keeping with the sort of economic backdrop we're observing, which, though quite strong and definitely far stronger than anybody would have anticipated considering how tight monetary conditions are, say, compared with what people were forecasting a couple of years back or so, does show unemployment a touch higher and GDP growth moderating. So it isn't at all shocking to find a tiny bit of softness in certain pockets of spending. Everything fits together into what is at times actually a fairly dull narrative.

Ken Usdin

analyst
#21

Thank you.

Jeremy Barnum

executive
#22

Thanks Ken.

Glenn Schorr

analyst
#23

Hello, and thank you so much. Jeremy, the conversations up to now regarding private credit and your team's latest remarks have centered on being able to put more onto the balance sheet and to compete whenever competition is required in that area. My sense, though, is that the bulk of what's been discussed concerns the direct-lending piece. So I'm wondering whether you're seeing greater momentum and more deals getting done there. And then, quite significantly, are you observing that same pattern emerge in asset-backed finance, given that it represents a larger slice of the overall landscape and also a larger slice of what you do? I'd welcome your perspective on that. Thank you.

Jeremy Barnum

executive
#24

Sure. Thank you, Glenn. Regarding private credit, there isn't much fresh information I can offer. One way I'd describe how things are shifting somewhat is that, as you're aware, an enormous amount of capital has flowed into private credit funds in search of transactions. And, picking up a bit on what I said earlier, with acquisition finance activity fairly subdued right now, what you have is plenty of capital competing for a relatively limited number of transactions. Consequently, at the margin, things have gotten somewhat calmer in that arena. One more point worth highlighting is that there's been talk about lender protections — the kind that were standard in the syndicated lender finance market — now appearing in the private market too, as folks come to recognize that certain of those safeguards are likely necessary in some situations even within the private market. That actually reinforces the idea we've been discussing, namely the blending of the direct lending arena with the syndicated lending arena. That's essentially our central thesis: we're able to deliver top-tier service along the whole spectrum, which includes things like secondary market trading. So our outlook on what we provide there is positive. That said, the present climate may be somewhat calmer than before. So now might not be the ideal time to gauge whether we're doing substantially more or substantially less in that arena, if you will. As for asset-backed financing, you posed that question to me previously. Back then, I said I hadn't come across much evidence of that pattern, and that remains true today. Still, plainly, there has to be something I'm overlooking. So I'll look into it further, and perhaps the two of us can discuss it.

Glenn Schorr

analyst
#25

If you're not hearing much about it, that's good news for you, so let's stop there. Perhaps just a single brief follow-up regarding your general positioning — when rates were low, you showed patience and good judgment, held off on deploying, and it turned out extremely well. That narrative is familiar to us. At present, it appears you possess a huge amount of surplus liquidity, and you're staying patient while rates are elevated. What I'd like to understand is how you view which sorts of triggers, which sorts of signals you're watching for in the marketplace to determine whether and when you'd lengthen duration?

Jeremy Barnum

executive
#26

Correct. Regarding duration, honestly, we have in fact increased duration somewhat across the past 2 quarters. So that's worth mentioning, and it happened more in the prior quarter than in this one. But I suppose I'd simply advise caution against — steering somewhat away from examining our disclosed cash balances and our balance sheet and then drawing the conclusion that, once you consider the duration idea in a comprehensive way, there's a great deal that could be approached differently when it comes to duration; so obviously, it's accurate that based on evidence, we've acted with substantial asset sensitivity throughout this period of rate increases, and that has produced considerable extra NII generation as things rose in the short run; yet whenever we examine the fund's total rate sensitivity, we consider it via both the EAR-style perspective (ph), the near-term NIR sensitivity, and additionally numerous other perspectives, among them diverse forms of scenario analysis, among them consequences for capital stemming from elevated rates; and as I believe Jamie has mentioned on a few occasions, our goal is actually to remain fairly balanced in that regard. Furthermore, because of the inverted yield curve, extending duration from current levels doesn't imply you're locking in a 5.5% rate; as a matter of fact, the forwards aren't particularly attractive considering our opinions about certain structural upward pressures on inflation and similar factors. So I believe once you combine all of that, I don't believe a significant shift in duration posture is something that's top of mind for us.

Glenn Schorr

analyst
#27

That's great, really useful. I appreciate it a lot.

Jeremy Barnum

executive
#28

Appreciate it, Glenn.

Matt O'Connor

analyst
#29

Morning. I'd like to hear more about the actual arithmetic that explains why ROTCE sits at an elevated 20% but is considered normalized at 17%. You've clearly indicated that NII (ph) is over-earning. So my question is this: does that single factor account for the entire gap between 20% and 17%? And if that's the case, is consumer deposit costs the whole story? Or might there be some additional elements you could walk us through?

Jeremy Barnum

executive
#30

Absolutely. That's a fair question, Matt. The way I'd frame it involves a few different considerations. Our returns have a tendency toward seasonality, correct? So when you construct a complete annual projection and allow sensible room either for yourself, or for analyst consensus, or for whatever else, and when you consider Q4, it's better to evaluate returns on an annual basis rather than looking at quarterly figures, and clearly you need to remove the onetime items; if you follow that approach, whatever figure you arrive at for the current year remains plainly above 17%. So indeed, normalization of NII represents one headwind source, mostly driven by anticipated increases in deposit costs; we've discussed this before. Yield curve consequences also play a role. At some stage, some cuts will be reflected in the curve; and ordinarily, if you construct a very, very, very supplemental model of the company, you'd expect something like expenses rising — with revenue expanding at some organic GDP-like pace, perhaps faster, while expenses increase at a comparable but marginally slower pace, generating a somewhat steady overhead ratio. Yet regardless of whether NII normalization ultimately proves smaller than we may have anticipated earlier, there remains some background — there remains some overhead ratio normalization that must occur. So even though our expense management discipline is as rigorous as it has always been, inflation remains above zero. We continue to execute on investments. Additional expense will still arrive within a somewhat flatter revenue backdrop, driven partly by NII normalization. And lastly, whatever conclusion emerges regarding Basel III endgame along with all the remaining components, you must anticipate a certain degree of denominator expansion, at minimum according to what's currently known. Naturally, any one of those elements might prove incorrect, yet that's roughly how we arrive at our 17%. And should you examine the different scenarios presented on the final page of my Investor Day presentation, it demonstrates those dynamics as well as the extent to which the range might actually fluctuate depending on the economic environment and other factors.

Matt O'Connor

analyst
#31

Yes. That chart was genuinely useful. I have just one quick follow-up; regarding those yield curve impacts, what exactly are you referring to? Since at present the curve is inverted, perhaps you're still accounting for some effect from that; however, over a longer horizon, one would anticipate some degree of steepness returning, which in my view ought to be beneficial; so what exactly do you mean? Thank you.

Jeremy Barnum

executive
#32

Yes. You and I have discussed this previously. I suppose I — fundamentally, I don't truly accept the idea that the correct framework is to view yield curve steepness beyond what forwards have priced as a structural source of NII or NIM for banks, if that makes sense. I mean, opinions differ regarding what's called the term premium. And clearly, at a time of an inverted curve along with varying treasury supply dynamics, how people think about it might be shifting; however, I believe we observed, back when rates sat at Zero and the 10-year note traded under 2%, everyone — many folks felt tempted to pursue additional NIM and additional NII through substantial duration extension. Yet when curve steepness reflects — is caused by expectations of genuinely aggressive Fed tightening, that's merely a timing matter and you may end up fairly offside from a capital standpoint and otherwise. So some intriguing questions exist about whether fiscal dynamics could produce a structurally steeper yield curve later on and whether that might be — capturing the term premium, as it were, could serve as a source of NII, though at this stage that strikes me as somewhat speculative.

Matt O'Connor

analyst
#33

I appreciate the specifics — that answers my question.

Jeremy Barnum

executive
#34

Thank you, Matt.

Mike Mayo

analyst
#35

Hello. Jeremy, you mentioned that calling an end to the over earning story is premature, and you pointed to increased deposit costs alongside the effects of reduced rates, diminished NII, DCM pull-forward, and rising credit cost. Is there anything else that belongs on that list? Also, what would make you decide to stop talking about over earning?

Jeremy Barnum

executive
#36

No. Honestly, Mike, I believe your list is accurate. I mean, one thing that would bring the over earning narrative to a close, frankly, is if our yearly returns came in nearer to 17%. I mean, if that figure represents the through-the-cycle level we have faith in, and right now we are generating above it, that is a quite straightforward lens through which to see it; however, the components of that, or the components you brought up, and the most critical single component, is the deposit margin. Our deposit margins sit far higher than what history would suggest, and that explains a great deal of why we continue to stress the over earning narrative.

Mike Mayo

analyst
#37

You're talking about that 17% through-the-cycle ROTCE expectation — what CET1 ratio went into that assumption?

Jeremy Barnum

executive
#38

Generally speaking, we'd start from requirements and then add a sensible buffer, and that buffer might come out somewhat smaller or somewhat larger depending on how the rules take shape. The modest piece of it depends on how volatile those pools are, which ties back to what I said earlier regarding SCB and CCAR. But as you're certainly aware, the ratio itself matters less than the dollar figures do; and right now those dollars hinge heavily on where the rules end up and where RWA ends up, plus things like the GSIB recalibration and so forth. So we've run quite a few scenario analyses similar to the approach I laid out at Investor Day, and those feed into those numbers, though that's clearly a major source of uncertainty sitting behind that 17%. That's exactly why, at Investor Day, when the topic came up, Daniel and I both made a point of stating specifically that we believed 17% remained within reach, provided there's a sensible result on the Basel III endgame.

Mike Mayo

analyst
#39

Let me step back and ask one more thing about that return goal. When I put the question to Jamie at the 2013 (ph) Investor Day — would holding 13.5% capital make sense — he essentially told you to take a hike, correct? And today you're sitting at 15.3% capital, and you're saying, well, we might want to hold a lot more capital here. I mean, at a certain point, if you're laying out $17 billion a year to make this company better, if you're picking up share through digital banking, if you're automating the back office, if you're pressing forward with AI, if you're doing all of this that you say others aren't, why wouldn't those returns climb over time? Or is your assumption just that competition will erode those benefits away? Thanks.

Jeremy Barnum

executive
#40

Yes. I mean, in short, Mike, and this is something we've discussed a lot and Jamie has discussed a lot, the market is extremely, extremely, extremely competitive; and our performance makes us very happy; the share we've taken makes us very happy; and 17% is actually an amazing number. And being able to achieve that, given how robust the competition is from banks, from non-banks, from US banks, from foreign banks and every one of the different businesses we compete in, is something we take real pride in. So there's a range around that number, obviously; so it isn't a promise, it isn't a guarantee and it can move around. But we take great pride in being in the ballpark of believing we can deliver it, again assuming a reasonable outcome on Basel III endgame; but the market is extremely, extremely, extremely competitive across every one of our products and services and regions and line (ph) segments.

Mike Mayo

analyst
#41

Okay, thanks.

Betsy Graseck

analyst
#42

Hey there, Jeremy.

Jeremy Barnum

executive
#43

Hello, Betsy.

Betsy Graseck

analyst
#44

I wanted to ask a follow-up detail question about the second quarter, specifically regarding the buyback dollar figure you executed. From what I can see in the press release and the slide deck, net common stock repurchases came to $4.9 billion. So my question is: what limits how much you choose to repurchase each quarter? I realize it depends on how much organic growth we achieve, and you did show some good momentum there. But after accounting for organic growth, is the driver how much we earn and a desire to repurchase those earnings? Or what framework should we use to think about the appropriate pace of repurchases going forward? I remember at Investor Day, there was quite a bit of conversation about not wanting to buy back my stock, and yet here we are doing exactly that, right? A question I get from investors pretty regularly is: what's the right way to think about how big this program should be?

Jeremy Barnum

executive
#45

Yeah, that's a great question, Betsy, and a completely fair one. Let me do my best to break it down. And I'll go in no particular order here. One point we've worked hard to stress across several different forums — including, in fact, in our latest 10-Qs — is this: getting into the business of offering guidance on buybacks isn't something we want to do. We plan to repurchase whatever seems appropriate given conditions right now, and we want the flexibility to adjust that whenever we choose. I get that this approach doesn't sit well with everybody, but it reflects a core belief of ours. I may as well state it plainly—it came through clearly in the (ph) too, yet I'll repeat it here. That covers the first item. Even so, let me still attempt to respond to what you raised regarding framework and governors. Broadly, pulling out of the market completely strikes us as illogical unless circumstances become far stranger than what we're seeing today. Naturally, should we ever find ourselves needing to raise capital quickly for any reason, we've managed that in the past, and we'd have no hesitation about halting repurchases altogether. Still, doing a bit of buying back seems sensible when you're producing the level of capital we are. Earlier we discussed that $2 billion rate—we're actually attempting to get past thinking in terms of a rate—but that's the origin of the concept, to put it that way. Regarding that $4.9 million figure — I get that it might come across as an arbitrary amount. But where it actually comes from is the second point we mentioned: we have these meaningful one-time gains tied to Visa. Thinking through what that means, once the exchange offer got accepted, we ended up with a considerable long stake in a liquid large-cap financial company — that's Visa — and honestly, its price tends to track our own stock pretty closely. So you could ask, what's the point of hanging onto it instead of just buying back JPMorgan shares? So we discussed it, Jamie discussed it — as we wind down the Visa stake, putting those proceeds to work in JPM — and that is exactly what happened during this quarter. That, then, is the reason the 4.9% comes out a bit elevated, and it lines up with what I said at our Investor Day regarding having modestly raised the volume of buybacks. And past that, what remains is the response to Steve's question, namely that — regarding your point about repurchasing earnings or whatever — when we're producing this kind of earnings and this much organic capital is being created, absent chances to put it to work organically or inorganically, and while still keeping our dividend healthy yet sustainable, if we fail to send that capital back, we'll simply keep expanding the CET1 ratio, and the levels of it — if you consider the company's long strategic outlook — aren't reasonable. They are simply artificially high and unnecessary. So one way or another, at some point that will have to be dealt with; it's just that we don't believe now is the right moment.

Betsy Graseck

analyst
#46

Great. Thank you Jeremy. Appreciate it.

Jeremy Barnum

executive
#47

Thanks Betsy.

Gerard Cassidy

analyst
#48

Hi, Jeremy, how are you?

Jeremy Barnum

executive
#49

Hi, Gerard.

Gerard Cassidy

analyst
#50

Jeremy, could you — I realize you addressed deposits earlier during this call when answering something. What caught my eye in the average balances is that non-interest bearing deposits held fairly steady from one quarter to the next, unlike in earlier quarters, when they kept falling in a consistent way. Naturally, this is among the things investors are watching closely when it comes to where the net interest margin is headed for you and your competitors. If possible, could you say more about what you're observing in that non-interest-bearing deposit account? I understand this is an average figure rather than a period-end one; the period-end figure might well be smaller. Still, what are you seeing on your side?

Jeremy Barnum

executive
#51

Yes. That's a fair question, Gerard. Honestly speaking, I have not zeroed in on that specific sequential explanation — meaning the quarter-on-quarter movement and the average non-interest-bearing deposits. That said, I'd argue the bigger issue is the broader picture: what is our expectation? What I mean is, how do we view the continued shift from non-interest-bearing to interest-bearing under present conditions, and what does that mean for our NII outlook along with what we anticipate for the weighted average rate paid on deposits? The response to that is: we still anticipate that shift taking place. Consider the wholesale side — many clients keep certain balances in non-interest-bearing accounts, and as time passes, for a range of reasons, we observe them shifting those balances to interest-bearing. So our expectation of that shift continuing remains, and because of that, it will create headwinds. That shift can occur within the firm, meaning from non-interest-bearing to interest-bearing or to CDs. Other times it moves to money markets or investments, which is what we observe in our Wealth Management business. And a portion of it does exit the company; yet something that gives us encouragement is how much of that yield-seeking flow we are in fact capturing via CDs and money market offerings, and so on, throughout our different franchises. So, the broad picture: I believe the movement from non-interest-bearing to interest-bearing will keep occurring, and that feeds into the modest headwinds we currently anticipate for NII. Anyway, I'll stop there, I suppose.

Gerard Cassidy

analyst
#52

Great, and to build on that, you've made it quite plain regarding charge-offs on consumer credit cards along with delinquency figures. We're all aware of what's happening in commercial real estate office, plus you consistently mention that net interest income is over-earning, naturally. For everyone, yourselves included, one of the standout credit quality narratives has been the C&I portfolio and just how robust it has remained amid this higher rate setting. I realize your figures continue to be pretty modest, yet within the Corporate and Investment Bank, non-accrual loans rose by roughly $500 million. Could you tell us what you're observing when it comes to C&I? Any indication of cracks or anything like that? Again, I understand your metrics remain solid, but I'm simply attempting to peer ahead and see whether something might emerge across the coming 12 months or so.

Jeremy Barnum

executive
#53

Yeah, that's a fair question. The brief response, I'd say, is no — we aren't truly detecting early indicators of cracks within C&I. I mean, sure, I'm with you on that; the C&I charge-off rate has stayed extremely, extremely low across a lengthy stretch. I believe we highlighted this during last year's Investor Day, if my memory serves. The C&I charge-off rate we observed over 10 years was essentially zero, more or less; so by historical measures that is plainly quite low. And although that figure makes us quite proud, I'd say it mirrors the rigor in how we underwrite as well as the robustness of our credit culture among bankers and the risk team — that isn't to say we actually operate that franchise expecting zero losses. Thus you must presume some upward strain will appear there. However, within any particular quarter, C&I results have a tendency to be rather uneven and rather idiosyncratic. So nothing within this quarter's outcomes, in my view, points to anything wider, and I haven't heard anybody inside the company speak that way, I'd add.

Gerard Cassidy

analyst
#54

Good, always glad to hear your perspective. Thanks very much.

Jeremy Barnum

executive
#55

Thank you, Gerard.

Erika Najarian

analyst
#56

Morning. Jeremy, I've got a single housekeeping item. For 2024, the consensus figure for provision sits at $10.7 billion. Would you mind settling this once and for all — those remarks Jamie made at an industry conference a while back — and help us work out whether $10.7 billion in provision fits the growth you're targeting in Card?

Jeremy Barnum

executive
#57

Sure, glad to clear that up. What Jamie said was about the allowance build, specifically the Card allowance — Card is the piece we're focused on here — and we were expecting roughly $2 billion across the whole year. Sitting here today, we actually think that figure comes in a bit above that, though it's roughly in the same range. Regarding how this affects the projected total allowance shift for the year, the last time I looked, it appeared somewhat understated in that regard; so it's unclear what the final figure will turn out to be, but our perspective hasn't changed. A question people have raised is how to square that buildup with the 12% OS expansion we've mentioned, since it appears somewhat elevated compared to what you'd typically expect from applying a normal coverage ratio to that kind of growth. There are two main factors behind that. First, revolving balances make up a larger share, since we're still seeing some normalization at that 12% level. Second, earlier vintages are seasoning, and that carries a somewhat bigger allowance for each unit of OS growth.

Erika Najarian

analyst
#58

Great. Thank you.

Jeremy Barnum

executive
#59

Thanks Erika.

Jim Mitchell

analyst
#60

Hello, and good morning. Perhaps one final inquiry regarding the deployment of surplus capital. It appears the two main organic avenues for doing so would be via the trading book or the loan book. So perhaps a couple of questions on that. First, trading assets rose 20% compared with a year earlier. Does that reflect a deliberate push from you, or is it simply driven by demand? And might there be additional chances to expand that? Second, apart from Cards, demand for loans has been rather soft. Do you have any views on whether you're noticing any shift in demand, or on how you're approaching loan demand moving ahead? Thanks.

Jeremy Barnum

executive
#61

Thank you, Jim. That's a good question; so indeed, trading assets are higher. This is essentially client activity, mainly secured financing tied to matchbook repo arrangements and comparable items that tend to — they expand the balance sheet considerably, yet carry fairly low risk and thus fairly low RWA intensity; so although our capacity to provide that financing to clients is something we're glad about and it genuinely reflects us embracing the franchise to serve our clients, it isn't especially RWA, and consequently capital intensive, and consequently it doesn't truly represent a bold decision on our side to put capital to work, so to speak; regarding loan demand, yes, I mean, sadly, I simply lack much fresh to offer on that topic of loan demand. That is, as you noted, loan demand stays rather subdued across the board other than Card. Our Card business is, naturally, not at all capital constrained. So any growth that's sensible there in terms of our customer franchise and our capacity to acquire accounts and keep accounts, and whatever suits our credit risk appetite, is growth that will be sensible. And so we're more than happy to put capital toward that. But it isn't limited by our readiness or capacity to put capital toward that. And naturally, for the remainder of the loan space, the very last thing we would do is let surplus capital cause us to lean in to lending that falls outside our risk appetite or outside our credit box, particularly in an environment where spreads are very compressed and terms are under pressure; so there's always a trade-off between putting capital to work and judging economic risk sensibly. And honestly, that is in a sense, a small-scale version of the bigger challenge we face at present. When I mentioned whether there was ever a time when the opportunity cost of holding back on deploying capital, relative to how appealing the opportunities beyond the company's walls are, now would be that time in terms of patience. That's somewhat one illustration of what I meant.

Jim Mitchell

analyst
#62

All right. Okay, great. Thanks.

Jeremy Barnum

executive
#63

Thanks Jim.

Jeremy Barnum

executive
#64

Very good. Thank you, everyone. See you next quarter.

Operator

operator
#65

Thanks to everyone for joining us on today's call. You're welcome to hang up now, and I hope the remainder of your day treats you well.

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